One finds innumerable postings when looking for articles on Greece's primary surplus. The debate about whether it should be 3,5% or 1,5% by 2018 seems endless. Some say that 3,5% is achievable and that's why the target should be set there. Others say that, at best, 1,5% is achievable. There is hardly any explanation for the uninitiated as to why there should be a primary surplus in the first place. The assumption seems to be that a primary surplus is good (because a primary deficit would suggest that there is no 'living beyond one's means'), and the greater the surplus, the better.
The primary surplus represents the amount of money available for debt service (i. e. interest expense). If the primary surplus is 1,5% of GDP and the interest expense is 3,5% of GDP, Greece needs fresh funding from its creditors to the tune of 2% of GDP in order to pay interest to those very same creditors. If the primary surplus were, instead, 3,5%, Greece could pay all of the interest without any need for fresh funding.
The honest message from the creditors would appear to be: "We no longer want to lend you money so that you can pay us interest. Instead, you should pay us interest out of your own resources. If your interest expense is 3,5%, you must achieve a primary surplus of 3,5%. Full stop!"
And then the question would be whether this makes sense.
It is often forgotten that debt can be a wonderful thing. If the proceeds of debt are spent on investments which generate a return greater than the cost of the debt, the more debt, the better. Two strategies would appear logical in consequence: (a) examine existing spending for possible reallocations from unwise purposes (waste) to wise purposes (revenue generation); and (b) tie new spending (i. e. new debt) to revenue generating purposes.
It is never debt per se or spending per se which is dangerous. The risk does not lie in the sources of funds; the risk always lies in the application of funds.
I would expect that there is no better short-term stimulus for the economy than reducing the state arrears which, allegedly, amount to 7 BEUR by now. Why creditors would prefer receiving interest which is funded by new loans from these very same creditors instead of having such money applied to a short-term stimulus like the reduction of arrears which might make higher interest payments in the future possible escapes my imagination.
That is exactly the point which I would like to see discussed in more detail but, regrettably, I don't see that.
The primary surplus represents the amount of money available for debt service (i. e. interest expense). If the primary surplus is 1,5% of GDP and the interest expense is 3,5% of GDP, Greece needs fresh funding from its creditors to the tune of 2% of GDP in order to pay interest to those very same creditors. If the primary surplus were, instead, 3,5%, Greece could pay all of the interest without any need for fresh funding.
The honest message from the creditors would appear to be: "We no longer want to lend you money so that you can pay us interest. Instead, you should pay us interest out of your own resources. If your interest expense is 3,5%, you must achieve a primary surplus of 3,5%. Full stop!"
And then the question would be whether this makes sense.
It is often forgotten that debt can be a wonderful thing. If the proceeds of debt are spent on investments which generate a return greater than the cost of the debt, the more debt, the better. Two strategies would appear logical in consequence: (a) examine existing spending for possible reallocations from unwise purposes (waste) to wise purposes (revenue generation); and (b) tie new spending (i. e. new debt) to revenue generating purposes.
It is never debt per se or spending per se which is dangerous. The risk does not lie in the sources of funds; the risk always lies in the application of funds.
I would expect that there is no better short-term stimulus for the economy than reducing the state arrears which, allegedly, amount to 7 BEUR by now. Why creditors would prefer receiving interest which is funded by new loans from these very same creditors instead of having such money applied to a short-term stimulus like the reduction of arrears which might make higher interest payments in the future possible escapes my imagination.
That is exactly the point which I would like to see discussed in more detail but, regrettably, I don't see that.