From ‘EU Task Force’ to ‘EU-Assistance desired by Greece/Greeks’
A. Introduction
The ExecutiveSummary of the 1st TFGR Report is a very well formulated document
which subtly caters to cultural and other idiosyncrasies of Greek society
(example: “The Task Force is a resource at the disposal of the Greek
authorities as they seek to build a modern and prosperous Greece”). Nevertheless,
it is recognizable that it was primarily written by foreigners for Greece and
not by Greeks for themselves.
The entire
conduct of Greece since the beginning of the crisis can be characterized as
non-ownership. This inevitably translates into a perception on the part of the
Greek people that “we have to do what they (the foreigners) force upon
us!”
This also
applies to the TFGR. As long as Greeks have the perception that the TFGR is
something which EU-elites have decided to bring upon Greece, the TFGR’s success
will be limited. It will face the risk of being perceived as a type of
occupation force; perhaps as enforcers of Troika-measures; and those Greeks who
cooperate with it may become seen as collaborators.
To start off,
below are 3 suggested mental experiments.
B. Mental experiment 1 - Who is it that needs
something from whom?
Suppose, back
in 2009, Greek leadership, in an attack of self-recognition, had recognized
that Greece was on the fast track towards becoming a failed state, doomed to
remain in the status of a developing country unless some corrective action
happened in a hurry. Suppose further that Greek leadership had recognized that
the only thing which could prevent such a disaster would be a massive know-how
transfer (‘development aid’) from the EU. Finally, suppose Greek leadership had
decided to invite brainpower and talent from all walks of Greek life to put
together a request for know-how transfer from the EU which would be so
convincing that the EU could not afford to reject it.
That
‘application for know-how transfer’ would have represented a very strong desire
of Greek leadership! Instead of trembling whether or not a next tranche would
be disbursed, Greeks might have trembled whether they get the know-how transfer
which they so urgently desired.
Interim finding: Something needs to be done so that the TFGR
becomes what it is supposed to be (i. e. something which the Greeks desperately
desire to have).
C. Mental experiment 2 – Why not Alexis
Tsipras?
The TFGR is
supposed to help Greek authorities as they ‘seek to build a modern and
prosperous Greece: a Greece characterized by economic opportunity and social
equity, and served by an efficient administration with a strong public service
ethos’ – this comes out of the Executive Summary. The same intention, with some
well-meaning interpretation, could come right out of the mouth of AlexisTsipras.
Suppose
Alexis Tsipras discovered that the TFGR ultimately has the same thing in mind
for Greece as he claims to have. Suppose further that Alexis Tsipras understood
that the TFGR is the only way to achieve a ‘modern Greece’. And, finally,
suppose that Alexis Tsipras would want to go down into history as the ‘father
of modern Greece’. Would it not be logical to assume that Alexis Tsipras would
travel Greece up and down to explain to Greeks that the TFGR is his own
invention and that it is the only solution for a better Greece? Would it not be
logical to assume that a majority of Greeks would become enthusiastic about the
TFGR?
Before that
would happen, would it not be logical to assume that established Greek
politicians/parties would try to jump on the TFGR-bandwagon before Alexis Tsipras owns it altogether?
Interim finding: Something needs to happen so that the TFGR
becomes perceived as something which every Greek politician wants to be the
owner of (instead of only tolerating it as a ‘necessary evil’).
D. Mental experiment 3 – Success stories
The Executive
Summary correctly stated that ‘some early successes are needed to build the
momentum for sustainable change’. Suppose the TFGR had been all over Greek
media in the last year with success stories. Success stories of how the
potential of 9 BEUR in cohesion policy projects was being utilized. Motto: a
‘huge celebration’ every time a new project, however small, gets successfully
under way. Suppose it would get so far that Greek media would continually question
the TFGR what is holding up more projects and what could be done about it?
INTERIM CONCLUSION: It is possible to imagine, without too
great an effort, that things could happen which would stimulate the sense of
ownership on the part of Greece and Greeks. Without such Greek ownership, it
seems impossible for the TFGR to achieve all the stated goals (that would be
like McKinsey starting a consulting job without proper introduction and support
from the customer’s management). Thus, a possible solution would be to find
external catalysts (people and/or events) which would catapult the TFGR into
the limelight which it requires and deserves.
E. Case in point – Cosco and the port of Piraeus
This seems to
be a prototype-example of a successful foreign investment and it should
urgently be marketed as such! Not only did a foreign investor pay a substantial
amount of money to the Greek state for leasing half of the harbor; it also
tripled the business volume in the first 2 years and is now investing 300 MEUR
into an expansion which will create new jobs and entirely new logistics
perspectives for Greece. The NYT described this as follows: “In many ways, the top-to-bottom overhaul that Cosco is imposing on
Piraeus is what Greece as a whole must aspire to if it is ever to restore
competitiveness to its recession-sapped economy, make a dent in its 24 percent
unemployment rate and avoid being dependent on its European neighbors for years
to come”.
Interim finding: Why does it take the NYT to make such a
commercial for what Greece really needs? The TFGR could/should dress up and market
to the public such an investment as the type of foreign investment that can be
and will be excellent news for Greece! (and Cosco should be involved in that
promotion). And the TFGR should present itself as the facilitator of many more
such projects in the future.
F. Allies in the cause - Groups
It will not
be enough for the EU to determine that Greece needs help to become a modern
country. Unless Greeks themselves determine that, all efforts will be more or
less futile. To promote the right kind of awareness, the TFGR should work
through ‘allies’.
Let’s just
identify 3 potential groups of allies: (a) media, (b) academia and (c)
students.
It should not
be too difficult to get the media involved. Not via press conferences! Instead,
via something like ‘monthly information afternoons’. A more or less structured
event where attendants get meaningful information and some food or drinks to
loosen the atmosphere. A good keynote speaker would be useful. Above all, they
should be involved by being asked to fill out questionnaires, make proposals,
etc. If such afternoons go over well, a sense of shared mission might develop
over time.
It should be
easy to get students, particularly students of economics, excited about the
activities of the TFGR. And one should offer such students opportunities to
involve themselves on a voluntary basis. The typical thing would be to have a list
of projects on hand which could be assigned to teams of students who are
interested to participate. As an incentive, one could offer that the best
projects submitted will be awarded a prize (perhaps personally handed over by
some visiting EU-official).
Interim finding: The point of all this is to create momentum
and excitement.
G. Allies in the cause - Individuals
The TFGR
should attempt to attract the support of key public personalities as champions
of its cause. One example which comes to mind would be Peter Economides (I take
him as an example because I have read his writings and seen some of his video
presentations).
Peter
Economides is a man who has a way with words and who is a charismatic
communicator. If he would talk about the TFGR in similar fashion as I have
heard him talk about new branding for Greece, there would be enthusiastic
followers all over. But first he himself would have to be made enthusiastic for
the TFGR.
The same
would really apply to other personalities who enjoy public recognition and
respect, be they artists or whatever. One could even imagine that a testimonial
campaign in favor of the TFGR might bring some benefit.
INTERIM CONCLUSION: Without external catalysts (people and/or
events), it will be difficult, if not impossible, for the TFGR to catapult
itself into the positive limelight which it needs to accomplish the desired
impact on Greece. The common premise should be that prominent individuals
support the TFGR on a voluntary basis, i. e. out of conviction and not out of
material interest.
H. Working with public administration (WWPA)
I argue
vehemently that it is not possible to change, in a sustainable way, a large
social system like a public administration solely by implementing new
processes, training the people and by perhaps appointing a few new managers. If
there are no accompanying measures, there will be significant passive
resistance to change which will offset many of the reform benefits.
I
differentiate between Hard Facts and Soft Facts. By Hard Facts, I mean things
like processes, flow charts, job descriptions, interfaces, etc. By Soft Facts,
I mean tools which affect cultures and attitudes (TQM, change management and
perceptive communication techniques, etc.).
I. WWPA – Third-party (neutral) evaluation
The process
of transmitting know-how from the ‘expert’ to the ‘student’ must be continually
checked and evalued by a neutral third party (an ‘observer’) to make sure that
the process is indeed working. An elite French civil servant might think that
he has just passed on the greatest wisdom to a Greek civil servant without
realizing that he has perhaps reached the ears, but not the mind and heart of
the ‘student’. A Greek ‘student’ may, without noticing it, turn off the
teacher’s motivation by continually acting like he knows everything already,
anyway. Above all, they may not be dealing at eye-level and without that, the
relationship will not work well.
The
‘observer’ would act as a coach who makes sure that both sides are on the same
wavelength; who recognizes any need for improvement; who organizes on a monthly
basis feedback sessions between ‘teacher’ and ‘student’; etc.
J. WWPA – Selection of counterparties
It is
imperative to have a strong representation of ‘practitioners’ both among the
‘teachers’ as well as the ‘students’. It is much easier to establish shared
wavelengths among ‘practitioners’ than among ‘elitist technicians’ (who may
focus on outsmarting one another).
‘Teachers’
should not only be selected on the grounds of their technical qualifications
but, even more importantly, based on their ability to communicate well and
collegially.
Among the
‘students’, it is important to open this process also to people on the lower
end in the hierarchy, particularly to motivated, impressionable and
enthusiastic young people (‘little heroes’).
In any group
there are likely to be one or more ‘leading steers’, that is people who can
sway group opinion in one direction or another. Particularly ‘observers’ should
look out for those ‘leading steers’. If they are positively-minded, they should
be moved into the limelight. If not, they should be neutralized.
It may be
necessary from time to time to set an example of harsh measures so that the
group can get back to order. If so, that measure has to be really harsh and
symbolic (disciplinary action) to get everybody’s attention back into the right
mindset.
K. WWPA – Verification
A perfect
example would be where a ‘teacher’ explains a new process, where the ‘student’
understands it but turns around and suggests even an improvement to that
process. That would be a ‘home-run’. With some creativity, one can actually
‘manufacture’ such home-runs a bit so as to provide for more frequent
experiences like the above.
In any event,
there must always be verification that things have not only been ‘learned’ but
also ‘understood and absorbed’. To think back of my Latin classes in Gymnasium:
my teacher should not only have checked that I translated the Gallic Wars
perfectly into German but he should also have checked whether I had learned
what happened during those wars.
L. TFGR – Internet presence
I could not
find any internet presence of the TFGR. In general, it is not good enough to do
good things; one also has to talk about them in order to create momentum and to
involve people.
Blogs, twitters: there are roughly two dozen serious and
competent bloggers/twitters who focus on Greece in English and who have
influence. They cover the political spectrum from The Left to the center-liberal. Over 90% of their
postings relate to Troika-measures and debt issues. In other words, they focus
on the ‘derivative’ of the problem. Hardly anyone focuses on how the Greek
economy could be gotten into shape, which is the ‘underlying’. My point is that
playing around with the ‘derivative’ will not solve anything unless the
‘underlying’ is fixed.
The TFGR
should capture the attention of these bloggers/twitters. If the latter became
as involved with TFGR-issues as they presently are with Troika/debt-issues,
life would be perfect for the TFGR.
The effort
required to accomplish the above would not be very significant. And, of course,
one should also work on something to reach Greek-speaking bloggers/twitters.
M. TFGR – Organizational positioning
It would be
interesting to make a survey among Greek parliamentarians and members of
government checking who knows what about the TFGR. It would be particularly
interesting to learn who knows which minister is responsible for the TFGR.
An outsider
gets the impression that the TFGR is a Brussels-based effort which has an
outlet in Athens and which interfaces with the Greek government. One would
definitely not get the impression that the TFGR is a priority project of the
Greek government itself.
Until the
Greek government (I think it should be the Prime Minister) comes out and
assumes loudly and clearly ownership of the TFGR, its effectiveness (and even
its success) will be much lower than it could be otherwise. If the Greek Prime
Minister does not take the initiative for that on his own, he should be
‘prompted’ to do so by EU-authorities.
In mid-2011,
McKinsey came out with a very interesting Greece Ten Years Ahead report (which, not surprisingly,
was more or less ignored in Greece). Beginning on page 27 of the Executive
Summary, there is a section titled “A new National Growth Model”. In it, the establishment of an
independent Economic Development and Reform Unit (EDRU) is recommended as an
institution directly reporting to the Prime Minister. This EDRU would be
critical to support the Greek state in coordinating, facilitating and monitoring
the implementation of growth reforms.
I argue that
the establishment of some type of this structure is imperative and I argue that
the TFGR should assume an eminent role in that structure. I further argue that
the personal responsibility for this project must be with the CEO of the
government, i. e. the Prime Minister.
If the Prime Minister
has trouble with that, one should prompt him by warning that Alexis Tsipras,
should he become Prime Minister, would make it one of his first decisions to
establish such a structure and he would be applauded for it!
Finally, to quote the OECD from its latest Public Governance Review of Greece: At
the core of its administration, Greece desperately needs a high-level structure
which has the authority, responsibility and capacity to lead the development of
a strategic vision and direction for public policies, and the effective
implementation of this vision in practice and over time.
N. TFGR – A ‘facilitator of foreign investment’
As important
as shipping was to the Greek economy (and, to a lesser degree, tourism),
remittances from Greeks working abroad (such as guest-workers in Northern
countries) were by far the largest source of foreign funding from 1950-74.
Since most of that money was spent on material and immaterial investments (such
as education for children), it is fair to say that those guest-workers laid the
foundation for Greece’s recovery after the Civil War.
Remittances
are similar in nature to foreign investment. As remittances withered away in
the 1970s, other sources of foreign funding replaced them. They came in the
form of EU-grants/subsidies (about 200 BEUR until 2010) and foreign loans (a
net increase of 283 BEUR from 2001-10). Very little came in the form of direct
foreign investment.
Thus, it is
clear that the driver behind the Greek economy has been funds flow from abroad.
Since the Euro, satisfactory employment (more or less) could only be maintained
because, on average, at least 30 BEUR flowed into the economy annually. Now
that this funds flow has forcefully been reduced, the internal and external
accounts are approaching a balanced situation but it has become clear that,
when balancing internal and external accounts, the Greek economy cannot employ
its people.
Thus, it is
also clear that if Greece is to have a better future, the funds flow from
abroad has to start up again and instead of taking the form of debt, it needs
to take the form of equity. Without significant foreign investment, the Greek
economy lacks a perspective. Foreign investment not only as a source of funding
but, equally important, as a source of know-how transfer in all areas.
The TFGR
should bring that message across to Greeks at every stop along the way.
O. TFGR – A ‘pillar of non-corruption’
It is clear
that Greeks have lost confidence in their political leaders. The latest index
by Transparency International shows that, since the crisis, Greeks perceive
their elites to have become even more corrupt.
What would
have been wrong if the journalist who had received a list with 2.000 foreign
bank account holders, instead of publishing the list, had handed it over to the
TFGR with the request to handle it in such a way as a ‘civilized’ country would
do?
What would be
wrong if the TFGR were to begin to show more ‘curiosity’ in some of the more
obvious abuses which are characterizing Greek public administration all the
time?
The TFGR
would not be doing that as a ‘spy’ for the EU. Instead, it would be doing that
as a great service to the Greek government and Greek people. And any Greek
politician who sees that differently should speak out and explain to the Greek
public why he thinks so. Not to mention the fact that making life harder for
corrupt elites would make the TFGR quite popular on Main Street.
P. TFGR – What if nothing works?
What if those
Greeks who are saying that ‘nothing will ever change in the Greek public
administration and public sector!’ turn out to be correct? Well, that may
happen but if it does happen, then even the TFGR won’t be able to do anything
about it.
Happy New Year to the 'Greek Task Force with EU assistance'!
Klaus R. Kastner
