Prof. Robert Skidelsky, the famous Keynes biographer, has declared himself on what he defines as the
Four Great Economic Fallacies of our Time. Seldom have I read a clearer statement on the principal economic questions of our time. Whether or not one agrees with Prof. Skidelsky is a different matter but he certainly has defined his views in admirable clarity!
Prof. Robert Skidelsky:
1. The Swabian Housewife. “One should simply have asked
the Swabian housewife,” said German Chancellor Angela Merkel after the collapse
of Lehman Brothers in 2008. “She would have told us that you cannot live beyond
your means.”
This sensible-sounding logic currently underpins
austerity. The problem is that it ignores the effect of the housewife’s thrift
on total demand. If all households curbed their expenditures, total consumption
would fall, and so, too, would demand for labor. If the housewife’s husband
loses his job, the household will be worse off than before.
The general case of this fallacy is the “fallacy of
composition”: what makes sense for each household or company individually does
not necessarily add up to the good of the whole. The particular case that John
Maynard Keynes identified was the “paradox of thrift”: if everyone tries to
save more in bad times, aggregate demand will fall, lowering total savings,
because of the decrease in consumption and economic growth.
If the government tries to cut its deficit,
households and firms will have to tighten their purse strings, resulting in
less total spending. As a result, however much the government cuts its
spending, its deficit will barely shrink. And if all countries pursue austerity
simultaneously, lower demand for each country’s goods will lead to lower
domestic and foreign consumption, leaving all worse off.
2. The government cannot spend money it does not have.
This fallacy – often repeated by British Prime Minister David Cameron – treats
governments as if they faced the same budget constraints as households or
companies. But governments are not like households or companies. They can
always get the money they need by issuing bonds.
But won’t an increasingly indebted government have to
pay ever-higher interest rates, so that debt-service costs eventually consume
its entire revenue? The answer is no: the central bank can print enough extra
money to hold down the cost of government debt. This is what so-called
quantitative easing does. With near-zero interest rates, most Western
governments cannot afford not to borrow.
This argument does not hold for a government without
its own central bank, in which case it faces exactly the same budget constraint
as the oft-cited Swabian housewife. That is why some eurozone member states got
into so much trouble until the European Central Bank rescued them.
3. The national debt is deferred taxation. According to
this oft-repeated fallacy, governments can raise money by issuing bonds, but, because
bonds are loans, they will eventually have to be repaid, which can be done only
by raising taxes. And, because taxpayers expect this, they will save now to pay
their future tax bills. The more the government borrows to pay for its spending
today, the more the public saves to pay future taxes, canceling out any
stimulatory effect of the extra borrowing.
The problem with this argument is that governments
are rarely faced with having to “pay off” their debts. They might choose to do
so, but mostly they just roll them over by issuing new bonds. The longer the
bonds’ maturities, the less frequently governments have to come to the market
for new loans.
More important, when there are idle resources (for
example, when unemployment is much higher than normal), the spending that
results from the government’s borrowing brings these resources into use. The
increased government revenue that this generates (plus the decreased spending
on the unemployed) pays for the extra borrowing without having to raise taxes.
4. The national debt is a burden on future generations.
This fallacy is repeated so often that it has entered the collective
unconscious. The argument is that if the current generation spends more than it
earns, the next generation will be forced to earn more than it spends to pay
for it.
But this ignores the fact that holders of the very
same debt will be among the supposedly burdened future generations. Suppose my
children have to pay off the debt to you that I incurred. They will be worse
off. But you will be better off. This may be bad for the distribution of wealth
and income, because it will enrich the creditor at the expense of the debtor,
but there will be no net burden on future generations.
The principle is exactly the same when the holders of
the national debt are foreigners (as with Greece), though the political
opposition to repayment will be much greater.