One has to understand that the collapse of the Euro is not something which can come about automatically. At least not as long as there is a Troika and an ECB.
Unfortunately, there is not only one variable to consider but, instead, there are four of them: the financing of budget deficits; the refinancing of maturing sovereign debt; the financing of current account deficits; and - most importantly - the financing of capital flight.
The financing of budget deficits is peanuts compared with the other three variables. In the case of Greece, we are talking about the petty sum of roughly 20 BEUR annually (and that includes high interest expenses, and the sum is declining). Add up all the budget deficits of the Periphery and tax payers of the Core would sleep well knowing that this is all they are in for. As I said, peanuts.
The refinancing of maturing sovereign debt is a bit more scary. But it is also the silliest variable. Refinancing debt is not something which represents failure. If the best corporations of the world could not refinance their debt, they would be out of business in no time. The refinancing of debt has only become an issue because private creditors have begun to think (or rather: have been allowed and encouraged to think) that they have a right to have tax payers take that debt off their shoulders. A supremely wrong assumption! Unfortunately, an assumption which, so far, the political class of the EU has proven correct.
Everyone, particularly sophisticated financial commentators, gets very excited about rises in yields on sovereign debt. That is silly! It is absolutely irrelevant for a country like Spain what the secondary market yields on its debt are! The only thing which matters is at what rate the country can borrow if and when it needs to borrow and that is, absent all other solutions, in the final judgement of the Troika and the ECB. There is absolutely no need to demonstrate that a country can meet all of its obligations until doomsday. All a country needs to do is to meet the next obligation!
The continued financing of current account deficits by the ECB is a serious issue because it allows "overvalued" countries to live beyond their means. They will not stop that unless they are forced by financial constraints to do that. If those countries were deprived of current account financing, they would have to import less and, above all, they would have to think about import substitution. If they did that, they would quickly increase domestic economic activity! A sign-off on globalization? In a way, yes. But if globalization causes damage, that damage needs to be constrained!
And, finally, capital flight. That is the killer-app! If things keep going the way they are under the present Euro-structure, all national deposits of the deficit countries will eventually end up in foreign bank accounts and all national banks will be refinanced 100% by the ECB. That is where the big numbers come into play. Would that be wrong? Not really, if each national economy remained in the Eurozone and if each national economy would eventually make it.
BUT: if only one national economy did not make it within the Euro-structure, all hell would break loose. Tax payers of the surplus countries would realize that they have financed the capital flight of the wealthy class of deficit countries. Those tax payers would have to write off their claims and, at the same time, they would watch how the wealthy class of the deficit countries could enjoy the continued value of their assets which was financed by tax payers.
That is the real Achilles nerve of the Euro-structure as is! What is the solution? If nothing else comes to mind --- capital controls!
Unfortunately, there is not only one variable to consider but, instead, there are four of them: the financing of budget deficits; the refinancing of maturing sovereign debt; the financing of current account deficits; and - most importantly - the financing of capital flight.
The financing of budget deficits is peanuts compared with the other three variables. In the case of Greece, we are talking about the petty sum of roughly 20 BEUR annually (and that includes high interest expenses, and the sum is declining). Add up all the budget deficits of the Periphery and tax payers of the Core would sleep well knowing that this is all they are in for. As I said, peanuts.
The refinancing of maturing sovereign debt is a bit more scary. But it is also the silliest variable. Refinancing debt is not something which represents failure. If the best corporations of the world could not refinance their debt, they would be out of business in no time. The refinancing of debt has only become an issue because private creditors have begun to think (or rather: have been allowed and encouraged to think) that they have a right to have tax payers take that debt off their shoulders. A supremely wrong assumption! Unfortunately, an assumption which, so far, the political class of the EU has proven correct.
Everyone, particularly sophisticated financial commentators, gets very excited about rises in yields on sovereign debt. That is silly! It is absolutely irrelevant for a country like Spain what the secondary market yields on its debt are! The only thing which matters is at what rate the country can borrow if and when it needs to borrow and that is, absent all other solutions, in the final judgement of the Troika and the ECB. There is absolutely no need to demonstrate that a country can meet all of its obligations until doomsday. All a country needs to do is to meet the next obligation!
The continued financing of current account deficits by the ECB is a serious issue because it allows "overvalued" countries to live beyond their means. They will not stop that unless they are forced by financial constraints to do that. If those countries were deprived of current account financing, they would have to import less and, above all, they would have to think about import substitution. If they did that, they would quickly increase domestic economic activity! A sign-off on globalization? In a way, yes. But if globalization causes damage, that damage needs to be constrained!
And, finally, capital flight. That is the killer-app! If things keep going the way they are under the present Euro-structure, all national deposits of the deficit countries will eventually end up in foreign bank accounts and all national banks will be refinanced 100% by the ECB. That is where the big numbers come into play. Would that be wrong? Not really, if each national economy remained in the Eurozone and if each national economy would eventually make it.
BUT: if only one national economy did not make it within the Euro-structure, all hell would break loose. Tax payers of the surplus countries would realize that they have financed the capital flight of the wealthy class of deficit countries. Those tax payers would have to write off their claims and, at the same time, they would watch how the wealthy class of the deficit countries could enjoy the continued value of their assets which was financed by tax payers.
That is the real Achilles nerve of the Euro-structure as is! What is the solution? If nothing else comes to mind --- capital controls!
Super Mario says he has a plan to save the Euro - has he told us what it is
ReplyDeleteOne idea seems to be to grant the ESM a banking license so it can borrow money from the European Central Bank that it can then lend to the National Central Banks to lend to National Governments to pay tinplated pensions.
I suspect the tax payers of one major surplus country are already fed up with financing the capital flight from at least one deficit country. Especially as much of it is flying over their heads and landing in non Euro neighbours.
What is the solution - admission of failure.
But they must wait for the deaths of Kohl and Delors, along with Mitterand they are the originators of the EMU and Euro - both of which are Australian fauna, the first a large flightless bird and the second a macropod also known as a Swamp Wallaby - there's an joke there somewhere.
CK
Band of Greece reports that deposits have declined to 150 BEUR in June, down from 174 BEUR at year-end 2011. Or down from 242 BEUR at the outset of the crisis.
ReplyDeleteTo the extent those who withdrew those deposits have not spent the money, they have now hedged - more or less free of charge - against any possible Greek bank bankruptcy or Grexit (either because they transferred the money offshore of because they stashed away Euro-notes).
Should banks go bankrupt or a Grexit occur, they will not incur any losses. European tax payers will, however!